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Recently, the OECD has suggested to seek private investment to realize and accelerate the realization of 
low-carbon, climate-resilient (LCCR) infrastructure. One of the options explored was the use of Design, 
Build, Finance, Maintain and/or Operate (DBFMO) contracts. Since experiences with these forms of 
Public Private Partnerships   are diverse, making the realization of government’s sustainability policies 
dependent upon these practices is not without risks. In this paper tensions between DBFMO contracts 
and LCCR-objectives are explored. Engaging in PPPs requires these tensions to be addressed. 
Governments must ensure that success conditions are in place, like the presence of a sound LCCR policy, 
potentials for return on investments, and the skills to act as professional client and competent contract 
and stakeholder manager. Last not least it requires the greening of the predominantly economic 
oriented regulation framework of PPPs.  
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Introduction 
In February 2012 the OECD organized an expert meeting in Paris to the discuss the potentials of private 
investments in low-carbon, climate-resilient (LCCR) infrastructure. The investments they envisioned are 
aimed at new and existing public infrastructures in for instance the field of transportation, energy, water 
management, public buildings or urban development, in order to increase their contribution to 
sustainability, more specifically to the reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gasses and to the 
adaptation to climate change. [1**] Investments in infrastructures were seen as a smart way to create a 
long-term and large scale lock-in in LCCR-friendly technologies, thus realizing a substantive improvement 
in the sustainable performance of urban and societal systems. One of the options explored were the 
potentials of public-private partnership (PPP) and more specifically the use of Design, Build, Finance, 
Maintain and/or Operate (DBFMO) contracts. DBFMO contracts were developed in the UK and have 
been copied in many developed countries. [2, 3] They give private consortia of banks, constructors and 
service suppliers a concession to  invest in new or existing public infrastructure. Concession periods are 
15 years or more, granting private parties operation monopolies in order to enable them to recover 
their investments. The contracts have an integral nature. They  combining design, construction, 
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operation and/or maintenance.  From a LCCR perspective this may be attractive, since it allows for a life 
cycle approach. DBFMO contracts give contractors incentives to invest in optimizations that improve the 
contribution of the infrastructure to LCCR objectives during the various phases of the life cycle of the 
project. For instance, since contractors bear the cost of the exploitation of a public building, they have 
an incentive to take the cost of energy use into account and therefor to design a sustainable building 
with a low energy consumption. [4, 5*]  
The OECD suggests that by pursuing PPPs governments may entice private investment in LCCR-
infrastructure when public funds fall short. However experiences with PPP are diverse. Besides 
successes,  failures are reported. The performance of PPPs is contested.  [6, 7, 8**] Linking ambitions to 
realize LCCR infrastructures to PPPs and more specifically by pursuing DBFMO contracts may introduce 
risks, which jeopardize rather than increase the likeliness of attaining  LCCR objectives. In this paper the 
assumptions underlying the OECD ideas are investigated by exploring six potential tensions between 
PPPs and LCCR-objectives: notably tensions between 
1. investments in infrastructure and LCCR-objectives; 
2. preferences for proven technology and innovation; 
3. long term contracts and flexibility; 
4. economic regulation and sustainability considerations; 
5. profitability and sustainability; 
6. the government business partnership and stakeholder involvement. 
Insights in the nature of these tensions also provide clues regarding the challenges policies and research 
need to address in order to meet the conditions under which for PPS and especially DBFMO contracts 
may contribute to the LCCR performance of infrastructures in urban and societal systems.   
 
Tension 1. Investments in infrastructure versus the realization of  LCCR-objectives 
 
The first assumption underlying the proposed strategy of OECD is that (private) investments in 
infrastructure are a smart way to contribute to sustainable performance, since a long term lock-n in 
technologies and practices that contribute to sustainability are created. However this strategy is 
vulnerable in a couple of respects. First of all is assumes governments are capable of choosing the right 
projects. This is not straightforward. Table 1 presents a typology of infrastructure projects illustrating 
that 1) many PPPs contribute to the realization of infrastructures that are all but LCCR-friendly and 2) 
that LCCR, like sustainability, is a far from straightforward concept. Projects can be climate resilient (CR) 
but increase the emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHG) like CO2, and the other way around. [1**, 9, 10] 
 
Table 1. Examples of how infrastructure projects may contribute to LCCR policies 
 Projects with negative mitigation impacts (increase of 
GHG)  
Projects with positive mitigation 
impacts (decrease of GHG) 
Projects with negative 
adaptation impacts (CR) 
New highways, roads, bridges without e.g. appropriate 
drainage systems 
Small hydropower (where competing 
with scarce water supplies; dense urban 
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developments 
Projects with positive 
adaptation impacts(CR) 
Water desalination plants; air conditioning in 
(conventional) infrastructure 
Waste to energy facilities; urban bus 
lanes with electric or LNG powered 
vehicles; multi modal transportation; 
retrofitting power plants; sustainable 
building; urban greenery 
Source:  [1**] 
 
Research shows that the LCCR performance of for instance a public bus system is not strait forward, but 
depends on many variables like the choice of busses, the layout of the route, the number of stops, the 
driving style of the  drivers. [11] Also investments in infrastructure may be costly, as a result of which 
investments in less sustainable, but also less expensive infrastructure or in measures that are not 
infrastructure based may be more ciost-effective. For instance, in the field of public transport 
infrastructure, the choice for rail infrastructure may be preferable from a sustainability point of view, 
may be less wise than an investments in rapid buss transport systems that need a far less expensive 
infrastructure. [12, 13] To avoid unaffordable infrastructure investments in dikes and levees, in Dutch 
water management policies a shift is made towards behavioral measures like evacuation preparation as 
an alternative.[8] 
 
So the contribution of private investments to sustainability depends on whether governments know to 
select the right projects. Furthermore, policies should also be aimed at the use  of projects in the next 
phases of their lifecycle (maintenance, operation, transfer and recycling), since the actual contribution 
of the infrastructure to LCCR objectives has to be realized in these phases.  
 
Tension 2. Proven technology versus innovation 
DBFMO contracts  are expected to enhance innovation. However, in practice the risk adverse attitude of 
private parties often result in a choice for proven technology rather than for innovative solutions. As far 
as governments expect private involvement to automatically result in the  adoption of innovative LCCR-
friendly technologies,  they are bound to be disappointed. [7, 8**]  
As governments often do not know which technologies contribute to LCCR-objectives, they may ask the 
market to come up with proposals. DBMFO contracts normally have procurement procedure that forbid 
communications between governments and private parties that prepare bids, in order to maintain 
conditions of competition. Early private involvement require changes in procurement procedures of 
DBFMO projects, for instance by introducing the procedure of  competitive dialogues. [14*]  This allows 
bidding consortia to come up with innovative ideas, under competitive conditions. This way of doing 
things also requires different selection criteria during procurement. Currently governments mostly 
select private consortia that come up with the financially most attractive proposal.  Competition in 
terms of sustainable performance requires that of LCCR performance criteria are used too.  
Tension 3. Long term contracts versus the need for flexibility.  
DBFMO-contracts are long-term contracts: they have concession periods of 15, 20 of even 30 years, 
sometimes even longer. In the short term, a lock-in may be realized of current LCCR technologies, but 
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communities may subsequently get stuck with these technologies while new developments or insights 
make these technologies outdated. Including  LCCR performance rewards in the contract that create 
incentives for private consortia to keep investing in upgrading  LCCR-technologies may increase 
flexibility. Granting the contract on the basis of performance instead of detailed reference designs 
allows private firms to keep looking for LCCR optimizations during the entire project life cycle. Likewise 
provisions for reviewing contracts in between and updating agreements in order to do justice to new 
technological findings and new insights may enhance flexibility. Contract design may also build upon 
‘real option’ theory, which implies not simply choosing the cheapest proposal, but choosing  bids that 
leave options open for future alternatives. [15] In public bus transport, for instance, this might involve 
additional investments in separate lanes, tunnels and viaducts that make it possible to upgrade the 
system to light rail in the future. [16] 
Tension 4. Profitability versus sustainability 
The absence of a positive business cases and the opportunity to recover investments is one of the main 
reasons why PPPs fail. [4, 5*] If LCCR requirements lead to higher costs that jeopardize the return on 
investments, these need to be compensated by either additional government contributions, or by 
redesigning the project in such a way that a positive cash flow is accomplished. One way to do so it by 
value capturing and scope management. 
Experiences in the Netherlands and elsewhere [14*, 17, 18] show that there is a great variety of options 
for capturing value. E.g. by linking-up of water infrastructure investments with nature development 
additional funds may become available for project development.. In urban planning  the construction of 
urban transportation systems may be combined with the  building of new neighborhoods or real estate. 
This requires new planning and management paradigms that leave room for integral planning and scope 
management, as well as new management and planning skills. For governments pursuing LCCR policies, 
this way of working also implies the building of new alliances with new partners in other then the 
familiar  sectors. 
Tension 5. Economic regulation versus safeguarding sustainability  
Market conditions and competition, essential for viable private involvement, are generally 
underdeveloped in infrastructure construction and infrastructure-based service delivery. As a result  
private parties develop market power and may engage in rent seeking and opportunistic behavior. In 
order to ensure the proper realization and functioning of new or existing public infrastructure by PPP 
arrangements, regulation is necessary. [19]  Regulation is realized by contracts and contract 
management.  Contracts include mechanisms such as price regulation, service quality standards and 
coverage targets, to incentify private consortia to construct and operate the infrastructure effectively. 
[20] The proper design and use of DBFMO contracts require a government that can act as a professional 
client and capable contract manager. Regulation of DBFMO contracts during their lifecycle also 
presupposes an adequate legislative framework and oversight. A capable regulator is needed that 
monitors the behavior of private companies. In western democracies audit offices and PPP expertise 
centers are part of the regulatory landscape. [21*]  
Current regulations have an economic orientation. Likewise, regulatory agencies and PPP units are 
focused on economic regulation, making sure competition is present and fair and governments pay 
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market prices.  Pursuing PPP for LCCR-infrastructure requires a greening of the regulatory framework. 
Regulation should include efforts and provisions to safeguard sustainability, more specifically LCCR 
objectives. [22*] Contracts should include requirements regarding the reduction of the use of fossil 
resources and the reduction of GHG gasses and measures aimed at the adaptation to climate change. 
However, this implies that governments themselves are committed to LCCR objectives, and have the 
expertise to make judgments regarding LCCR performance. LCCR standards and indicators have to be 
available. All this presupposes  a transition in regulatory contexts that in many countries and sectors is 
not yet underway. [23]  
Tension 6: the government-business interface versus stakeholder involvement 
Political risks are an important reason for private investors to refrain from investments in public 
projects. They perceive resistance of residents, users, pressure groups and local governments against 
infrastructure projects as serious political risks. [4, 5, 7] For instance, in recent years targets of the Dutch 
government with regard to wind energy by building inland wind farms have not been realized, due to 
the resistance of local governments and residents. [24] Government and private parties are often 
preoccupied with realizing their joined ambition, while neglecting their dependencies on third parties. 
DBFMO contracts fail to meet expectations due to a lack of stakeholder analysis and stakeholders 
management. In the case of wind energy participation and co-ownership are seen as prerequisite for 
transforming initial resistance into support. Adequate stakeholder management should be part of the 
repertoire of strategies of governments to reduce the perceived risks for private parties to invest in 
LCCR infrastructure. [21*, 22**] Since stakeholders are not necessarily committed to LCCR policies, 
stakeholder management should be aimed at aligning private, public and stakeholders interests with 
each other and with LCCR objectives. Private investments in LCCR infrastructure requires stakeholder 
participation, perhaps even to an extent that PPPs turn into  Public Private Community Partnerships 
(PPCPs).  
Conclusions 
Striving for private investment to realize and accelerate LCCR infrastructure when public budgets fall 
short  is an attractive strategy at first sight. In this contribution we examined the potential tensions 
between PPPs and LCCR-objectives. Table 2 summaries this exploration.  
Table 2. Tensions between DBFMO contracts and LCCR requirements 
 Characteristics of DBFMO 
contracts 
Requirements from LCCR 
perspective 
Research and policy challenges 
Tension 1 Infrastructure focused Ensuring LCCR 
performance 
 Development and selection of high 
potential, LCCR friendly alternatives 
 Ensuring LCCR performance during 
the life cycle of the project 
Tension 2 Proven technology 
 
Innovative technology 
 
 Optimize life cycle approach 
 Steer on innovative competitive 
dialogues 
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Tension 3 Long term contracts Application of new 
technologies and 
practices 
 Reel options 
 Provisions in contract for 
adaptations 
 Functional specification 
Tension 4 Return on investment Costs of sustainability  Addressing affordability 
 Ensuring positive business cases 
 Value capturing and scope 
management 
Tension 5 Economic regulation Sustainability 
considerations 
 Development and institutionalization 
of LCCR indicators 
 Greening of regulation and 
management 
Tension 6 Government-business interface Stakeholder involvement 
and ownership 
 Stakeholder management and 
public-private-society partnerships 
 
PPP is not without risks and may be a dangerous ally, jeopardizing the success and reputation of LCCR 
infrastructure. Engaging  in PPPs and more specifically in DBFMO-projects  requires these tensions to be addressed. 
In some situations it may be sensible to refrain from PPPs or DBFMO-contracts. Pursuing LCCR infrastructures by 
DBFMO contracts imposes high demands on governments as policy makers, clients, regulators and stakeholder 
managers, as the inventory of policy and research challenges illustrates. Last not least it requires the incorporation 
of sustainability considerations in the predominantly economic oriented regulation framework of PPPs.  
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